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Moscow and New York, June 23, 2011: 
 
The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow, and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), a 
joint undertaking of the Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University in New 
York, are releasing the results of their second joint survey of Russian outward investors today2. The 
survey is part of a long-term study of the rapid global expansion of multinational enterprises (MNEs) 






Despite the global crisis of the last few years, Russia has remained one of the leading outward 
investors in the world. The foreign assets of Russian MNEs have grown rapidly and only China and 
Mexico are further ahead among emerging markets. As the results of our survey show, several non-
financial3 Russian MNEs are significant actors in the world economy. The foreign assets of the 20 
leading non-financial MNEs were about USD 107 billion at the end of 2009 (table 1).  
 
Their foreign sales4 were USD 198 billion and they had more than 200,000 employees abroad. 
Together, the 20 firms had some 800 foreign affiliates in 87 countries. The top 20 list includes state-
controlled firms as well as private ones, although private firms under the control of Russian oligarchs 
dominate (see box 1). Resource-based MNEs form a clear majority, although there are a number of 
                                               
1 This report was prepared by an IMEMO team led by Alexey Kuznetsov, Head, Center for European Studies at IMEMO. The 
team also included Anna Chetverikova, Senior Researcher, and Natalia Toganova, Researcher, at the Center. It is based on a 
survey conducted in February and March 2011. Research assistance was provided by Anna Gutnik, Sergey Khavronin and Ilya 
Darmanov. 
2 The first joint IMEMO-VCC survey was conducted at the end of 2009 and covered the period 2006-2008. Its results are 
available at: http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/emerging-market-global-players and http://www.imemo.ru.  
3 The methodology of the international project of which this report forms a part excludes financial firms. 
4 The foreign sales of Russian MNEs include exports from Russia as well as the sales of their foreign affiliates − except for 
foreign affiliate exports back to Russia. These figures correspond with the revenue data by foreign geographical segments that 
are typical for Russian MNE reports. Few Russian MNEs publish separate data on foreign affiliate sales.  
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firms in services too. It is perhaps worth noting that, although the firms at the top of the list 
(LUKOIL and Gazprom) are much larger in asset size than most of the others, the list is nothing like as 
lopsided as the lists in some of the other country reports published by the VCC. Only five of the 20 
firms have less than USD 1 billion in foreign assets.  
 
Table 1. Russia: The top 20 non-financial outward investors, by foreign assets, 2009 (USD 
milliona) 
 




Oil & gas extraction / refineries / petroleum 
retail 
Listed (Main foreign 
owner – 20.0%) 
28,038 
2 Gazprom 
Oil & gas extraction / gas distribution / 
electricity 
Listed (State – 50.0%) 19,420 
3 Evraz Iron & steel / mining of metal ores and coal Listed 10,363 
4 Severstal Iron & steel / mining of metal ores and coal Listed 9,907 
5 Mechel Iron & steel / mining of metal ores and coal Listed ~ 5,100 
6 Norilsk Nickel Non-ferrous metals / mining of metal ores Listed ~ 5,000 
7 Sovcomflot Shipping 
Unlisted (State – 
100.0%) 
~ 4,745 




Iron & steel / mining of metal ores Listed ~ 4,000 
10 VimpelCom Telecommunications 
Listed (Main foreign 
owner – 29.9%) 
3,756 
11 RENOVA Conglomerate Unlisted ~ 2,972 
12 TMK Metal tubes Listed 2,248 
13 INTER RAO UES Electricity production and supply Listed (State – 65.7%) 1,338 
14 Zarubezhneft Oil extraction / refineries 
Unlisted (State – 
100.0%) 
~ 1,300 
15 UC RUSAL Non-ferrous metals / mining of metal ores Listed ~ 1,100 
16 Atomenergoprom 
Mining of uranium ores / nuclear materials 
and equipment 
Unlisted (State – 
100.0%) 
812 
17 FESCO Sea and railway transportation Listed 712 
18 Polyus Zoloto Mining of gold ores Listed ~ 500 
19 OMZ Nuclear and other electric power machines Listed 478 
20 Acron Agrochemicals Listed 440 
Total 106,529 
 
Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a.  
 
a The exchange rate used,  in accordance with Russian accounting practice, is the official rate of the Central Bank of Russia as of 
December 31, 2009: USD 1 = RUR 30.24. 
b The symbol ‘~’ indicates that the amount is an estimate by the IMEMO team. In these cases, company reports did not provide 
an exact official figure because they usually had data only on non-current foreign assets (see annex table 1a). Moreover, the 
companies themselves either did not respond to the survey or asked the team to use its own estimates. 
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The majority of this year’s top 20 companies also figured in our last top 20 list. Koks (16th place at the 
end of 2008) sold all its steel plants in Slovenia, while ALROSA withdrew from its large diamond joint 
venture LUO-Kamachia-Kamajiku in Angola and went from the 18th place to the 29th place. Eurochem 
went from the 17th place to the 21st place. The conglomerate Basic Element (6th place last year) got 
into trouble during the crisis because of its foreign loans and was saved only with several billion US 
dollars worth of state support. In the process, it lost some of its foreign assets and had to reduce its 
stake in its subsidiary UC RUSAL to a minority one. UC Rusal figures on this year’s list on its own (see 
also annex II). Other newcomers are Atomenergoprom, Polyus Zoloto and Acron, the last of these 
taking a small step up from 21st place in 2008 to 20th in 2009.  
 
A special case is VimpelCom. Since 1998, this company had been under the joint control of Russian 
Altimo (from the Alfa Group) and Norwegian Telenor, which controlled 44% and 29.9% of its shares 
respectively in 2009. The remaining shares traded freely on stock exchanges. In October 2009, the 
merger of Russian VimpelCom and Ukrainian KyivStar (also a joint project of the Alfa Group and 
Telenor) was announced. The deal was closed in 2010 and VimpelCom Ltd. was registered in Bermuda. In 
2010, the company continued its foreign expansion through further mergers. Today, Altimo owns only 
31% of VimpelCom’s shares with 25% of the voting rights, as against the 44% it controlled in 2009. 
When contacted, a Vimpelcom representative refused to answer the IMEMO-VCC survey questionnaire 
on the grounds that VimpelCom can no longer be regarded as a Russian company. The main reasons for 
this answer were i) the relocation of the company’s head office from Moscow to Amsterdam, ii) the 
listing of the firm only on the New York Stock Exchange (since 2010) and iii) the large voting rights of 
Altimo’s foreign partners. Telenor now owns 32% of VimpelCom’s shares with 25% of the voting rights, 
while Weather Investments (Italy) owns 19% of the shares with almost 30% of the voting rights. 
 
 
Profile of the top 20 
 
The Transnationality Index (TNI) 
 
The average TNI for the 20 top Russian MNEs is 33%, which hides large variations among both firms 
and the TNI components. Thus, while the share of foreign sales in total sales is 67%, the share of 
foreign assets in total assets is only 18% and the share of foreign employment in total employment is 
even lower at 14%. As for firms, several large Russian companies have only recently begun investing 
abroad. As a result, such companies usually have a low TNI (e. g., Polyus Zoloto and Atomenergoprom), 
although some “experienced” MNEs (e. g. Sistema, VimpelCom and Gazprom) also have a low TNI 
because their core activities are focused on Russian infrastructure development (see annex table 1).  
 
Distribution by industry 
 
Companies in the oil & gas, steel, and non-ferrous metals sectors control the majority of Russian 
foreign assets (see annex figure 1). These industries represent areas of Russian specialization in the 
world economy. However, other Russian industries have also begun investing abroad. Companies in 
transport, telecommunication, machinery, electricity supply, nuclear materials, and chemicals are also 
to be found on the list of the top 20. Many other MNEs, too small to make it on to the list, are to be 
found in such industries as building materials, food, retail and information technologies.  
 
It is also worth noting that representatives of some industries would rank higher if the top 20 list had 
been organized on the basis of non-current foreign assets, which may in some ways be a better 
reflection of foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad than total foreign assets. For instance, 
Severstal’s non-current foreign assets are almost the same as those of Gazprom (see annex table 1a), 
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which has significant current assets abroad in the form of gas reserves in European gas holders. 
Another example is Vimpelcom, whose non-current foreign assets are greater than those of Norilsk 
Nickel. The explanation involves differences in important features of different industries − telecom 
companies cannot “store” their production in foreign subsidiaries.  
 
The geography of Russian MNEs  
 
Some Russian MNEs have affiliates almost all over the world. For example, the largest Russian 
multinational, LUKOIL, has affiliates in 36 countries while Gazprom has affiliates in 33 countries (see 
annex table 1). Nevertheless, the effects of neighborhood and cultural ties are still evident in the 
geographical distribution of Russian assets abroad (see annex table 2 and annex figure 2). The most 
popular locations are European countries, although the priorities − “old” EU members, countries of 
South-Eastern Europe, and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) − depend on 
the specialization and the strategies of individual firms. At the end of 2009, Russian MNEs on the list 
had 46% of their foreign assets in Western and Central Europe. The share of the former Soviet 
Union’s area (excluding the Baltic States) was 22% and the share of North America was 19% (see 
annex figure 3). However, there are sharp contrasts among industries, for example between oil & gas 
on the one hand and steel on the other (see annex figure 3a). The most unpopular locations for almost 
all Russian MNEs were South Asia and South America. Recently, some companies have begun expanding 
into East Asia & the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Although the top 20 Russian MNEs dominate other Russian MNEs in foreign activities, the distribution 
of their foreign assets does not exactly correspond with the geography of Russian outward FDI as a 
whole (see annex table 6 and annex figure 7). First of all, Russian MNEs use “classic” off-shore and 
other tax havens (such as Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Luxembourg, and Gibraltar) 
both for round-tripping and trans-shipping FDI. Moreover, some Russian oligarchs control both large 
companies with specialization in one industry or several related industries (i. e. “classic” MNEs) and 
investment funds for expansion into other sectors (see box 1). For example, Alexey Mordashov 
controls Severstal, a steel MNE, as well as S-Group Capital Management, which operates funds with 
foreign assets in tourism and some other areas. Several Russian oligarchs do not have “classic” MNEs 
at all and realize their ambitious investment plans via special financial funds. For instance, Alexander 
Lebedev controls the National Reserve Company, which operates in banking, insurance, tourism, 
transport, and the media. There is also significant Russian outward FDI in real estate. Every year, 
including the period of the current global downturn, Russians have been spending more than USD 10 
billion a year for cheap real estate in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Montenegro, Spain, Germany, Turkey, and 
various seaside and mountain resorts elsewhere. There is also significant investment in real estate by 




The motives of Russian FDI abroad are varied. The typical outward FDI motives of Russian MNEs, 
especially in M&A deals, are the searches for markets and resources (see annex table 4). Their FDI 
can also be strategic-assets-seeking but it is rarely efficiency-seeking (this latter motive is to be 
found in Russian FDI only in the CIS and a few other countries, where labor costs are lower than in 
Russia). It can also be driven by image-building motives and by the need to insure against political risk. 
Russian owners of the largest companies are still under suspicion of developing new methods of “capital 
flight”. In some cases, through their FDI abroad, Russian MNEs have received access to cheap 
financial resources from international stock exchanges for the development of their business in 
Russia. The strengthening of negotiating power is another specific FDI motive of Russian oligarchs. 
Such power is useful both in dialogue with the Kremlin on anti-monopoly investigations and in the 
struggle against protectionism abroad. The main factor behind these special Russian drivers of 
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outward investment is the extraordinary personalization of some of the largest MNEs. For example, 
Alexey Mordashov, the CEO of Severstal, owns 82.9% of Severstal’s shares; the chairman of NLMK’s 
board, Vladimir Lisin, controls 85.5% of NLMK’s shares; and the chairman of Mechel’s board, Igor 
Zyuzin, owns 66.8% of Mechel’s shares (see also box 1 and annex II). 
 
 
Box 1. Russian oligarchs as investors abroad 
 
The journalistic term “oligarch” has become a scientific term in Russia because it points to the nature of Russia’s 
largest private companies, especially their ownership structure, tight relations with the State (or more exactly 
with some high-ranking officials), and stable oligopolistic positions in the modern Russian economy.  According to 
Forbes, there are more than 100 billionaires in Russia (the full list is available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires/list). Thus, a country in the 12th place by GDP takes the 3rd place in 
the world by the number of billionaires. All large Russian fortunes are based on the results of privatization deals 
of the 1990s, when some people received major plants and mines for what were in effect token prices. In many 
cases, their close relations with high-ranking officials were crucial to the success of these deals.  
 
The oligarchs’ participation in Russian political life varies. Some, like Roman Abramovich, participate actively. 
Abramovich is the speaker of the Chukotka Autonomous District Parliament and a former governor of this Russian 
region. Despite his official position, Mr. Abramovich owns significant shares in some of the largest private 
companies (e. g. Evraz) and usually spends much of his time abroad. Other oligarchs try to avoid all forms of 
political life. Russian public opinion is indifferent to this issue and makes no distinctions among oligarchs. The 
continuing importance of the oligarchs in the Russian economy is a function of the state’s tolerance of monopolies 
and oligopolies, especially in the oil and metal sectors, as shown by its unwillingness to enforce anti-trust 
legislation that is very similar to its US and EU counterparts. In addition, the State has often provided massive 
financial support to large and inefficient private companies. Such support has indeed been crucial to the survival 
of several oligarchs’ empires in the global crisis. Not that the State offers unqualified support, for it does 
periodically raise questions about the oligarchs’ continuing investment in luxury real estate abroad. 
 
Sources: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a; Jakov Pappe and Jana Galuhina, Rossiyskiy krupniy biznes: perviye 
15 let (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2009); and Alexey Kuznetsov, ed., Vliyaniye rossiyskoy investitsionnoy ekspansii na 
obraz Rossii v Yevrope (Moscow: IMEMO, 2010), available at: http://www.imemo.ru. 
 
The role of the State 
 
There is a widespread perception that the Russian Government exercises a significant influence on the 
operations of Russian MNEs. In fact, there are only a few large investors under state control. On the 
other hand, there is much that the State can do to support outward investment by private companies. 
First, medium-sized Russian companies need state support in insuring their operations against political 
and other non-commercial risks abroad, especially outside Europe and North America. However, the 
State insurance agency for export credits and outward FDI, plans for which were announced several 
years ago by the Russian State Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs 
(Vnesheconombank), has still not been established. Next, Russia has not been very aggressive in 
pursuing double taxation and bilateral investment treaties with other countries. For example, there 
were only 48 bilateral investment treaties with Russian participation in force at the end of 2009. 
(There are nearly 200 countries in the world.) Still, dozens of new treaties are in the process of 
ratification and ten of them came into force in 2010 (see annex table 8). 
 
Thirdly, all Russian MNEs need informational support. Russian businesspeople do not usually know 
enough about the investment climate, the political system, the cultural specifics and other important 
features of potential host countries for their FDI. Unfortunately, government agencies themselves 
lack the necessary intellectual resources to furnish such support and do not work well with those who 
could help them, such as experts from Russian think tanks and universities. The think tanks and other 
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such institutions themselves need greater financial resources but the Russian firms that could most 
easily supply them are no better than government agencies at working with them.  
 
Finally, the Russian institutional base for MNE expansion abroad is underdeveloped. For example, 
Russia is the only large industrialized country not in the WTO. This fact produces additional barriers 
in its dialogue with its main economic partner, the European Union. Until it joins the WTO, Russia 
cannot become a member of the OECD, although it has been formally engaged in the process of 
acceding to the OECD for the past four years.  
 
Ownership and management nationality 
 
The shares of only four companies among leading Russian MNEs are not listed on any stock exchange. 
Of these, three are fully state-owned enterprises, while one (RENOVA) is a conglomerate controlled 
by its founder, V. Vekselberg. For the listed firms, the most popular stock exchanges are the Russian 
RTS and MICEX, but either shares or depository receipts (ADRs / GDRs) of some Russian 
multinationals can also be bought on foreign stock exchanges, e. g. the London Stock Exchange (11 
companies − see annex table 3). However, although several companies have a significant free float 
abroad, their key shareholders remain Russian. For example, the foreign owners of Evraz have 27.6% 
of its shares while Lanebrook Ltd. under its three Russian owners controls the rest; the foreign 
owners of Sistema control less than 20%; and so on. Russian principal owners usually keep MNEs under 
their tight control (see the company profiles in annex II) and almost all CEOs are Russian. Norwegian 
Telenor, which held 29.9% of VimpelCom’s shares in 2009, is the most significant foreign shareholder 
on the top 20 list. It is worth noting, however, that the presence of foreigners on governing bodies is 
fairly widespread. Severstal, VimpelCom, and several other companies have a significant share of 
foreigners on board (annex table 3).  
 
Official languages  
 
All Russian MNEs derive from large Russian domestic enterprises and their main shareholders are 
Russian. So Russian is naturally the official language of all companies on the top 20 list. At the same 
time, the internationalization of their business activities, listings on foreign stock exchanges, and the 
relatively high numbers of foreigners on boards have led many MNEs to adopt English as a second 
language. The majority of the top 20 publish their annual and other reports in both Russian and 
English. Moreover, their Russian versions are usually regarded as translations from the English 
versions. Some reports − e. g., Form 20-F for the NYSE or the Quarterly Report of Open Joint-Stock 
Company − are available in only one language, English in the former case and Russian in the latter. 
Although managers of leading Russian MNEs gradually become bilingual and the firms often have their 
own translation departments, they also use the translation services of independent firms.  
 
Head office locations 
 
Most firms on the top 20 list have their head offices in Moscow (see annex figure 4). Three companies 
have other locations of official registration but their main decision-making centers have migrated to 
the Russian capital as well. (Severstal is officially registered in Cherepovets in the Vologda Region, 
Norilsk Nickel in Dudinka in the Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Evraz in a foreign country, Luxembourg.) Only 
four companies have head offices (i.e., decision-making centers) outside Moscow – two in sea-port 
cities (Sovcomflot in St. Petersburg and FESCO in Vladivostok) and two in the regional capitals of 
European Russia (NLMK in Lipetsk and Acron in Velikiy Novgorod). In contrast, head offices in 
peripheral towns are not unusual for the second echelon of Russian MNEs. For example, MMK (iron and 
steel, 25th place) has its head office in Magnitogorsk, Concern Tractor Plants (machinery, 27th place) 
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has it in Cheboksary, ALROSA (diamonds, 29th place) has it in Mirny, and VSMPO-AVISMA (non-
ferrous metals, 33rd place) has it in Verkhnaya Salda. 
 
Acquisitions versus greenfield projects  
 
The rapid growth of Russian assets abroad is powered mainly by cross-border acquisitions of large 
companies in resource-based industries (see annex table 4). Russian companies usually take over cheap 
old plants or new service companies and then make new investments in their development. There are 
only a few significant greenfield projects in the leading industries of Russian MNEs: in oil & gas, 
telecommunications and steel (annex table 5). It is important to stress that, although the media 
usually publish more impressive figures on Russian greenfield FDI, many investment announcements are 
no more than elements of corporate PR-campaigns. For example, information about LUKOIL’s plans to 
build a new refinery in the United States for USD 1,047 million appeared on the eve of a summit of 
the two countries’ Presidents in July 2009, although LUKOIL’s President V. Alekperov almost 
immediately disclaimed the plans in the leading Russian business newspaper Vedomosti. Some 
greenfield projects of Russian MNEs were indeed serious plans but they failed during the crisis. For 
example, plans for the construction of new plants in Vietnam by UC RUSAL (proposed investment USD 
1.5 billion) and in India by Mechel (proposed investment USD 414 million) were announced in 2008 but 
had to be abandoned during negotiations with local partners. 
 
Internationalization of R&D 
 
With rare exceptions, leading Russian MNEs are not very successful in R&D activities, especially in 
undertaking such activities abroad. This has to do at least in part with their industrial specialization, 
since oil & gas firms are always far behind producers of pharmaceuticals, telecommunications 
equipment or other high-tech products when it comes to R&D. For example, LUKOIL spent only USD 
100 million on R&D (0.12% of its turnover) and Gazprom only USD 245 million (0.25% of its turnover) in 
2009. Furthermore, their R&D activities are concentrated in Russia, although they do have 
international patents (see annex box 1). Russian metal MNEs do have some R&D departments abroad, 
but RENOVA and Sistema are the only companies from the top 20 with significant foreign R&D 
activities. RENOVA’s core foreign R&D activities are connected with its Swiss machinery subsidiaries. 
RENOVA controls 56.7% of the shares of Oerlikon, which spent USD 194 million on R&D (7.3 of its 
sales) in 2009, and 30% of the shares of Sulzer, which spent USD 59 million on R&D in the same year. 
Sistema’s subsidiary Sitronics (64% of the shares) specializes in telecom equipment and spent USD 21 
million (2.1% of its revenue) on R&D in 2009, both in Russia and in its R&D centers in Athens and 
Prague. 
 
Changes in foreign assets, sales and employment  
 
The top 20 as a group showed steady growth in foreign assets even during the global crisis, although 
their total assets showed a small dip (1.5%) in 2008, followed by a nearly 12% jump in 2009 (table 2 
below). In 2009, the domestic operations of many of these companies also recovered from the crisis, 
although the assets of some others continued to decline. Some of the top 20 significantly expanded 
their activities abroad in 2009. Mechel was the brightest example, with an 80% increase in its foreign 
assets, especially in its non-current foreign assets, that year (see annex table 1a). As a result, the 
total assets of the 20 top MNEs increased by 10% between 2007 and 2009 while there was a 15% rise 
in their foreign assets over the same period (table 2).  
 
Most of the top 20 are large exporters. The global downturn thus caused significant declines in their 
foreign as well as total sales. Foreign sales fell by nearly 25% from 2008 to 2009, with the 2009 sales 
lower even than 2007 by 7% (table 2). Total sales fell by 22% over the same year and the 2009 sales 
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were lower than 2007 by 3%. The consequences of this loss of export revenue were, however, less 
dramatic for Russian expansion abroad than might have been expected. For some firms, like the oil 
companies, the new acquisition opportunities were more important than the relatively small fall in oil 
prices. For others, who had accumulated large war chests before the crisis, the crisis offered 
opportunities to buy weak competitors. While some firms did postpone their new projects in 2009, 
actual divestments were relatively rare.  
 
Russian MNEs generally prefer not to publish employment figures. The owners and top managers do not 
usually care much about public opinion and trade unions are weak. So the annual and financial reports of 
Russian MNEs often contain only figures on assets and revenues and other indicators for investors. In 
fact, many companies closed some Russian operations during the crisis but retained most of their 
employees abroad. As table 2 indicates, the total employment of the top 20 has been falling steadily 
over 2007-2009, while their foreign employment rose sharply in 2008 (nearly 13%) and dropped very 
little in 2009 (somewhat over 2%). This is a consequence of several factors: the increasing 
internationalization of Russian MNEs, the greater productivity of EU and US labor, and the greater 
sensitivity of Russian oligarchs to their image abroad than to their image at home. It is not that 
Russian oligarchs do not understand the precarious nature of their position in Russia − they understand 
it only too well. They simply want to make sure that their fallback homes in Western Europe and the 
United States remain hospitable. 
 
 
Table 2. Russia: Snapshot of the top 20 MNEs, 2007-2009 (USD million and number of employees) 
 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 % Change, 2007-2009 
 
Assets 
Foreign 92,900 100,425 106,529 +15 
Total 544,900 536,800 598,948 +10 
Share of foreign in total (%) 17 19 18  
 
Sales 
Foreign (including exports) 212,000 261,900 198,000 -7 
Total 305,400 378,600 295,762 -3 
Share of foreign in total (%) 69 69 67  
 
Employment 
Foreign 184,000 207,000 202,000 +10 
Total 1,520,000 1,490,000 1,427,000 -6 
Share of foreign in total (%) 12 14 14  
 
Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
 
The big picture 
 
During the latter part of the 2000s, Russia became one of the leaders in outward FDI among emerging 
markets. According to the Central Bank of Russia and UNCTAD, the country reached the 15th world 
rank on outward FDI stock at the end of 2006.5 During the global economic crisis, several Russian 
MNEs lost their foreign subsidiaries while the assets of other companies were devalued. However, 
Russia remained in the 15th place by outward FDI stock due to major new investment outflows. For 
                                               
5 Bank of Russia, International Investment Position of Russia for 2000-2010, available at: http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics, and 
World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, annex table 4, available at: http://www.unctad.org. 
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example, Russia was in 7th place by FDI outflows in 2009, although that was the most difficult year for 
the country during the current downturn (see annex figure 5). According to the Bank of Russia, 
Russian outward FDI stock reached nearly USD 319 billion at the end of 2009, almost 16 times larger 
than in 2000 (see annex figure 6). Of course, some Russian FDI outflows went offshore only to return 
home. In 2009, Russian FDI outflows to Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and other off-
shore locations exceeded USD 18 billion. However, not all these investments were round-tripping FDI. 
For example, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were major trans-shipment points, with the 
final destinations being the CIS and countries in Central Europe. 
 
There are several reasons for the active investment expansion of Russian companies abroad, easily 
explained by the two most famous direct investment theories. On the one hand, the eclectic theory 
explains the market-seeking and efficiency-seeking motives of Russian MNEs.6 The leading Russian 
investors are large exporters and their outward FDI supports their sales. In some cases, it reduces 
transport costs for finished goods (hence the refineries of LUKOIL in European countries) or secures 
their exports against the political instability of transit countries (hence the participation of Gazprom 
in pipelines). Other motives are connected with getting around trade protectionism in the United 
States or the EU, especially in the metal industry. However, asset-seeking motives are more popular 
among Russian MNEs in developed countries. As for resource-seeking motives, they are typical for 
Russian outward FDI in Kazakhstan and in some African countries. The second or Uppsala theory of 
the internationalization of the firm emphasizes the role of close psychological distance and low 
language and cultural barriers.7 These factors are important for Russian investment in Slavic 
countries, as are the strong economic and political ties inherited from the Soviet period. Many Russian 
companies with outward FDI do not have much experience in investing abroad and thus tend to prefer 
buying companies or establishing affiliates in the familiar environment of post-communist countries, 
especially those with a positive attitude towards Russians. In contrast to South Africa or India, Russia 
may be said to be lucky in its neighborhood for outward FDI. 
 
At the beginning of the 2000s, Russia had a variety of multinational types, a situation typical for 
countries at the initial stages of internationalization (from the United Kingdom of the 19th century to 
the China of the 1990s). Fairly quickly, however, large former Soviet enterprises gradually 
transformed themselves into dominant Russian multinationals, drawing on the industrial and cultural 
ties of the Soviet Union. Oil & gas, iron & steel, and non-ferrous metal industries are now the main 
areas in which major MNEs operate. Large Russian investors abroad do not, however, reflect the 
industrial structure of the Russian economy. Many firms producing considerable value added in various 
industries drawing on sophisticated modern technologies have thus far found the domestic Russian 
market large enough for their appetites, although we may expect this to change in the near future. 
Two non- resource-based areas in which Russian firms are already investing abroad with some success 
are telecommunication and nuclear technology. Other areas in which we may expect more outward FDI 
in the future, from companies in the second echelon group, are construction and building materials 
(e. g., Eurocement and LSR Group), machinery (e. g., Sitronics from the Sistema conglomerate, Tractor 
Plants and Borodino), food products (e. g., WimmBillDann and SPI Group), and transport (e. g., 
Globaltrans, Russian Railways and UTair). A notable novelty is the ongoing internationalization of 
almost all leading Russian service companies, from media firms and IT firms to retailers and banks (on 
the last, see box 2). 
 
                                               
6 John H. Dunning, “The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and some possible extensions,” Journal of 
International Business Studies, vol. 19 (1988), no. 1, pp. 1-31 and Kalman Kalotay, “Russian multinationals and international 
investment paradigms,” Research in International Business and Finance, vol. 22 (2008), no. 2, pp. 85-107. 
7 Jan Jonanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne, “The internationalization process of the firm – a model of knowledge development and 
increasing foreign market commitments,” Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 8 (1977), no. 1, pp. 23-32 and Alexey 
Kuznetsov, “Pryamiye inostranniye investitsii: effekt sosedstva,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, vol. 52 
(2008), no. 9, pp. 40-47. 
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In the mid-2000s, many Russian MNEs expanded abroad through acquiring foreign firms in difficult 
financial conditions. The advantages of developing value-added chains were ignored in favor of easy 
acquisitions. However, such acquisitions, though envied by their Western competitors, became serious 
burdens for new Russian investors during the recent downturn. Moreover, some Russian exporters 
unreasonably based their outward FDI not only on their huge pre-crisis revenues but also on foreign 
loans. The clearest example was Basic Element, owned by O. Deripaska. During the global crisis, the 
Basic Element empire was saved only with extensive state support. Even so, Deripaska lost some of his 
foreign assets in machinery and construction and had to reduce his stake in his largest metal company, 
UC RUSAL, which launched an IPO in 2010. 
 
 
Box 2. Russian financial multinationals 
 
Our report does not cover financial services but an internationalization process can be seen in the Russian 
financial sector as well. However, no Russian financial MNE can be compared with the largest Russian non-financial 
MNEs in internationalization. The global competitiveness of the Russian financial sector is low. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, none of the banks or insurance companies took the opportunity to become real multinationals. 
On the contrary, many foreign financial multinationals secured a footing in the Russian market.  
 
There are two main kinds of Russian financial MNEs. The first group consists of old MNEs, which were born as 
MNEs after the USSR collapsed. These companies inherited branches from their Soviet predecessors. VTB is an 
example, with branches in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other countries. Ingostrah, an insurance 
company, is another example. During the 1990s, VTB and Ingostrah had similar problems – they found it difficult 
to become client-friendly. When the financial crisis arrived, Ingostrah had urgently to scrap its business in 
Western Europe. VTB dealt only with corporate clients in European countries and could thus stay afloat in the 
crisis. 
 
The second group consists of new banks and insurance companies, which in the boom years before the crisis tried 
to grab a share of the Western and Central European market. The Bank of Moscow went to the Baltic States and 
Serbia while insurance company RESO-Garantia bought a subsidiary in Lithuania. These efforts were less than 
successful and Russian banks have since focused on the CIS (see annex table 7). 
 
Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a.  
 
 
Several Russian companies lost their foreign subsidiaries during the recent crisis. There were 
examples in machinery, construction, insurance and some other industries. The situation in iron and 
steel was the worst. The largest non-ferrous metal companies survived but went down in the top 20 
ranking. The crisis was even more severe for Russian greenfield FDI. Many projects were either 
abandoned or postponed. However, some companies (mainly oil & gas MNEs) continued to make large 
new deals in 2009 (see annex table 4).  
 
When the economic recovery began in 2010, firms in many industries showed that Russia remained an 
important source of outward FDI. For example, VimpelCom and Atomenergoprom significantly 
strengthened their global position. Further industrial and geographical diversification of Russian 
outward FDI can also be observed. If this is to continue, however, Russian MNEs need more state 
support outside the familiar regions of the CIS, Europe and North America. There have been some 
moves in this direction − the Russian Government has recently entered into some double taxation and 
bilateral investment treaties outside the traditional regions of Russian investment. The fault does not 
all lie with the State, however. Much as Russian MNEs need informational support, few are willing to 
cooperate with either state bodies or independent experts in the field of outward FDI.  
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Russian policy on outward FDI is largely undeveloped, mainly because outward investment is a relatively 
unfamiliar feature of the Russian economy. To the extent that a policy exists, it seems to be based on 
questionable assumptions. Thus the Russian state tries to protect the several dozen existing Russian 
MNEs while failing to stimulate hundreds of other Russian companies into venturing abroad. Medium-
sized companies with competitive advantages in economic niches and evident weaknesses in the political 
realm are more suitable objects of state policy than the currently dominant corporate giants. It should 
be said, however, that these giants are quite skilled at securing state support by claiming that they 
need it to fight protectionism abroad. Recent examples of this include RENOVA in Switzerland, UC 
RUSAL in Guinea and Surgutneftegaz in Hungary. 
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For further information please contact: 
 
Institute of World Economy and International  
Relations (IMEMO) of Russian Academy of Sciences  
 
Alexey Kuznetsov  




Anna Chetverikova  





Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment (VCC) 
 





Vishwas P. Govitrikar 






Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) Project 
 
The IMEMO ranking of Russian multinational enterprises was conducted in the framework of the Emerging Market 
Global Players (EMGP) Project, a collaborative effort led by the Vale Columbia Center (VCC – see below). It brings 
together researchers on FDI from leading institutions in emerging markets to generate annual reports on leading 
multinationals in each participating country. Reports on 12 countries have been published so far (several on some 
of them): Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Turkey. For 
further information, visit: http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/emerging-market-global-players. 
 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences  
 
The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) was established in 1956 as a successor to 
the Institute of World Economy and Politics which had existed from 1925 to 1948. It is the leading Russian 
research center in the field of world development and one of the world’s leading think tanks focusing on public 
policy, economics, social issues, security and ecology. The Institute is a non-profit organization which acts within 
the Charter of the Russian Academy of Sciences. For many years, research carried out by IMEMO has served as a 
reliable basis for political decision-making. At the same time, IMEMO takes an independent and uncommitted 
position in its research. The Institute employs approximately 400 researchers, including several members of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences and more than 260 professors and Ph.D.s. IMEMO has two dozen research centers 
and departments, including the Center for Industrial and Investment Studies, the Center for European Studies, 
and the Center for Research in Transitional Economies. Since December 2006, the Institute has been directed by 
Academician and professor of economics Alexander Dynkin. For more information, see http://www.imemo.ru. 
 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment 
 
The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), headed by Dr. Karl P. Sauvant, is a joint 
undertaking of the Columbia Law School and The Earth Institute at Columbia University. It seeks to be a leader 
on issues related to FDI in the global economy, paying special attention to the sustainability dimension of this 
investment. VCC focuses on the analysis and teaching of the implications of FDI for public policy and international 
investment law. Its objectives are to analyze important, topical and policy-oriented issues related to FDI, develop 
and disseminate practical approaches and solutions, and provide students with a challenging learning environment. 
For more information, see http://www.vcc.columbia.edu. 
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ANNEX I. Tables, figures and boxes 
 
Annex table 1. Russia: The top 20 multinationals: Key variables, 2009 (USD milliona and number of employees) 
 
Assets Sales Employment Rank Company 
Total Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign 






1 LUKOIL 79,019 28,038 81,083 67,221 143,500 26,000 46 169 36 
2 Gazprom 276,561 19,420 98,908 72,004 393,600 18,900 28 69 33 
3 Evraz 23,424 10,363 9,772 6,822 110,000 24,000 45 15d 8 
4 Severstal 19,644 9,907 13,054 9,098 84,000 6,000 42 54 18 
5 Mechel 13,183 ~ 5,100 5,754 3,015 80,000 8,300 34 61 16 
6 Norilsk Nickel 22,760 ~ 5,000 10,155 7,928 83,900 3,800 35 57 19 
7 Sovcomflot 6,068 ~ 4,745 1,222 n.a. 7,800 ~ 5,000 (75) 9d 5 
8 Sistema 42,011 ~ 4,300 18,750 ~ 2,900 ~ 80,000 ~ 11,000 13 14d 11 
9 NLMK 12,502 ~ 4,000 6,140 3,859 62,800 5,800 35 78 16 
10 VimpelCom  14,733 3,756 8,711 1,279 36,400 9,200 22 69 17 
11 RENOVA ~ 20,000  ~ 2,972 ~ 17,400 ~ 6,900 ~ 120,000 29,000 26 10d 6 
12 TMK 6,681 2,248 3,461 1,290 46,000 3,900 26 17 13 
13 INTER RAO UES 3,414 1,338 2,153 1,422 ~ 15,000 n.a. (65) 30 14 
14 Zarubezhneft 2,831 ~ 1,300 563 560 n.a. ~ 7,000 (70) 8 5 
15 UC RUSAL c 23,886 ~ 1,100 8,165 6,696 75,800 n.a. (35) 18 13 
16 Atomenergoprom 22,015 812 6,488 3,709 ~ 20,000 ~ 1,000 22 28 15 
17 FESCO 2,260 712 650 499 ~ 10,000 n.a. (60) 56 10 
18 Polyus Zoloto 3,791 ~ 500 1,225 n.a. 19,200 4,000 (20) 19 8 
19 OMZ 1,356 478 867 567 ~ 16,000 1,900 38 8 4 
20 Acron 2,809 440 1,241 977 13,400 4,000 41 7 5 
Total (average for TNI) ~ 598,948 ~ 106,529 ~ 295,762 ~ 198,000 ~ 1,427,000 ~ 202,000 (33) 796 87 
 
Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
a The symbol ‘~’ indicates that the amount is an estimate by the IMEMO team. The exchange rate used,  in accordance with Russian accounting practice, is the official rate of the Central 
Bank of Russia as of December 31, 2009: USD 1 = RUR 30.24. 
b The Transnationality Index (TNI) is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales, and foreign employment to total 
employment. It is expressed as a percentage. The TNI for six firms is calculated without data for one variable and is therefore shown in parentheses. 
c UC RUSAL was a major part of the conglomerate Basic Element, which figured in last year’s ranking. UC RUSAL is no longer fully controlled by Basic Element – see narrative report and 
annex II for further details. 
d Several small foreign affiliates are excluded as they do not figure in the company’s reports.   
Page 14 of 37 
 
Annex table 1a. Russia: The top 20 multinationals: Total and non-current assets, 2008-








foreign assets Rank Name 
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
1 LUKOIL 71,461 79,019 50,088 52,228 23,577 28,038 9,791 10,076 
2 Gazprom 243,995 276,561 190,486 220,737 17,940 19,420 4,948 6,747 
3 Evraz 19,451 23,424 13,160 19,171 11,199 10,363 n.a. n.a. 
4 Severstal 22,514 19,644 11,829 11,459 11,477 9,907 6,417 6,297 
5 Mechel 12,010 13,183 9,265 10,700 ~ 2,800 ~ 5,100 2,246 4,190 
6 Norilsk Nickel 20,759 22,760 13,702 14,352 4,600 ~ 5,000 1,709 2,005 
7 Sovcomflot 5,727 6,068 5,189 5,465 ~ 4,581 ~ 4,745 n.a. n.a. 
8 Sistema 29,177 42,011 19,467 28,333 ~ 3,900 ~ 4,300 3,804 ~ 4,200 
9 NLMK 14,065 12,502 8,718 8,625 4,985 ~ 4,000 n.a. n.a. 
10 VimpelCom 15,725 14,733 14,810 13,286 4,386 3,756 3,921 3,197 
11 RENOVA ~ 20,000 ~ 20,000 ~ 15,000 ~ 15,000 ~ 3,129 ~ 2,972 ~ 1,609 ~ 1,740 




3,200 3,414 2,291 2,661 1,267 1,338 777 696 
14 Zarubezhneft 2,456 2,831 1,644 1,786 ~ 1,100 ~ 1,300 1,064 1,279 




15,911 22,015 15,273 20,375 71 812 n.a. n.a. 
17 FESCO 2,777 2,260 2,279 1,949 1,143 712 594 358 
18 Polyus Zoloto 3,079 3,791 1,991 2,699 0 ~ 500 0 482 
19 OMZ 1,275 1,356 556 553 377 478 192 234 
20 Acron 2,145 2,809 1,649 2,185 332 440 243 283 
Total 536,800 598,948 401,104 456,530 100,425 106,529 n.a. n.a. 
 
Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
a The symbol ‘~’ indicates that the amount is an estimate by the IMEMO team. In 2009, Koks, Eurochem and ALROSA 
left the top list of Russian MNEs and Atomenergoprom, Polyuz Zoloto and Acron joined it. UC RUSAL stopped being part 
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Annex table 2. Russia: The top 20 multinationals: Regionality Indexa, 2009 
 
Regions 











& Central Asiab 
Other 
Europe 






affiliates 1 LUKOIL 3 3 0 0 0 11 65 7 11 169 
2 Gazprom 4 0 1 0 0 24 67 4 0 69 
3 Evraz 0 13 0 0 0 33 33 0 21 15d 
4 Severstal 0 4 2 0 0 11 52 0 31 54 
5 Mechel 0 0 0 0 0 13 66 20 2 61 
6 Norilsk Nickel 0 7 4 0 7 0 60 15 7 57 
7 Sovcomflot 0 11 11 0 0 0 78 0 0 9d 
8 Sistema 7 0 0 7 0 58 21 0 7 14d 
9 NLMK 0 0 3 0 0 3 83 5 6 78 
10 VimpelCom 0 3 4 0 0 36 29 14 14 69 
11 RENOVA 0 20 0 0 0 10 50 0 20 10d 
12 TMK 6 0 12 0 0 23 41 0 18 17 
13 INTER RAO UES 3 0 0 0 0 44 50 3 0 30 
14 Zarubezhneft 0 0 25 0 0 25 37 13 0 8 
15 UC RUSAL 0 11 0 0 0 17 39 28 5 18 
16 Atomenergoprom 0 11 7 0 7 28 36 0 11 28 
17 FESCO 0 0 25 0 4 2 56 9 4 56 
18 Polyus Zoloto 0 0 0 0 0 47 32 16 5 19 
19 OMZ 0 0 0 0 0 13 50 37 0 8 
20 Acron 0 0 29 0 0 0 42 0 29 7 
Average  
(total for last column) 
1 3 4 0 1 18 56 8 9 796 
 
Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
a The Regionality Index is calculated by dividing the number of a firm’s foreign affiliates in a particular region of the world by its total number of foreign affiliates and multiplying the 
result by 100. 
b The former Soviet Union’s area excluding Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
c Including Bermuda. 
d Several small foreign affiliates are excluded as they do not figure in the company’s reports. 
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Foreign stock exchanges 








LUKOIL RTS a, MICEX b 









Evraz – LSE 27.6 30 Russian 




Mechel RTS, MICEX 

















LSE 24.2 38 Russian 
NLMK RTS, MICEX LSE 13.2 33 Russian 
VimpelCom RTS 




44  Austrian 
RENOVA – – 0 0 Russian 
TMK RTS, MICEX 
LSE, 
US Over-the-Counter 
24.4 70 Russian 








Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, New York 






Atomenergoprom – – 0 0 Russian 




Polyus Zoloto RTS, MICEX 
LSE, 
US Over-the-Counter 
35.0 11 Russian 
OMZ RTS, MICEX 










Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
a RTS – “Russian Trading System” Stock Exchange 
b MICEX – Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange 
c LSE – London Stock Exchange
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2 2008 Evraz IPSCO Inc. Iron & steel 
Canada 






part resold to 
TMK in Jan. 
2009) 
3 2007 Evraz 
Oregon 
Steel Mills 
Iron & steel USA 100 2,276 
4 2008 Evraz Palmrose 
Iron & steel, 
coke and min-
























MOL Oil & gas Hungary 21.2 1,852 
7 2008-2009 LUKOIL ISAB Oil refinery Italy 49 1,830 










is the seller – 
see deal 2) 





10 2009 Mechel BCG Coal-mining  USA 100 1,447 
Total 
23,102 
(without deal 8) 
 
Sources: Thomson ONE Banker, Thomson Reuters and information from annual and other company reports.  
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Annex table 5. Russia: The top 10 outward greenfield investments, completed, 2007-2009 
(USD million)a 
 
Years Company Destination Industry & project 
Value realized by 




Telecommunications − SSTL – 73.7% of 






Iron & Steel 
Works (MMK) 
Turkey 
Construction of two steel works and 
infrastructure by joint company MMK 
Atakaş (first objects were ready in 2008, 





GTEL-Mobile – 40% of shares (start of 








Infrastructure which is connected with a 







Development of petroleum subsidiary 
(reconstruction and modernization of 
refinery and petrochemical destroyed 
during a civil war, as well as development 





Construction of the second bloc of gas-














Construction of steel plant Hamriyah Steel 








First stage of ecology-friendly 
modernization of Burgas subsidiary 
(sulphate alkylation plant) 
93 
 
Sources: Company press releases and annual and financial reports.  
 
a The symbol ‘~’ indicates that the amount is an estimate by the IMEMO team. 
b On the eve of the global crisis, Sistema planned to invest USD 4 billion to USD 7 billion or even USD 10 billion till 
2017-2020 in Indian telecommunications. In 2009, Sistema made its plans more realistic. 
c The project was announced in May 2007. Its construction was completed between July 2007 and March 2011. The total 
joint investment of the Russian and Turkish partners was USD 2.1 billion. 
d Russian Railways established a subsidiary and signed a contract in spring 2008 for the construction of railways in Libya. 
The price of the contract was € 2.2 billion (i. e., about USD 3 billion). By the time the civil war broke out in 2011, about 
10-15% of the investment had been made. At the end of 2009, the largest completed object was a rail-welding plant 
under construction in Ra’s Lanuf. 
e Gazprom, its German subsidiary Wingaz and the independent German partner RAG built the second block of the gas-
holder between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2011. The total investment was € 300 million, i. e., about USD 400 
million. 
f Gazprom bought the Razdan power station with four blocks for USD 248.8 million in 2007 and built its fifth block 
between 2008 and 2010 at a cost of USD 194 million. Some media sources have announced more significant Gazprom 
investments in Armenia but they were partially connected with other M&A and greenfield projects (e. g., with the 
construction of a pipeline linking Armenia and Iran). 
g Metalloinvest built the Hamriyah Steel plant between June 2007 and January 2010. The total joint investment of 
Metalloinvest and its local partner was USD 150 million.  
h Gazprom was going to invest USD 300 million in these projects in several years with production sharing agreements. As 
of June 2011, the proposed investment is in question because of the current civil war in Libya. 
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Annex table 6. Russia: Top 25 destinations of non-financial FDI outflows, 2007-2009 
(USD million) 
 
Rank Destination 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 on average 
1 Cyprus a 14,630 9,369 16,930 13,643 
2 Netherlands a 12,502 2,732 3,624 6,286 
3 United States 974 7,265 1,628 3,289 
4 United Kingdom a 2,454 3,886 2,166 2,835 
5 British Virgin Islands a 1,425 3,790 2,366 2,527 
6 Canada 181 6,723 20 2,308 
7 Bermuda a 2,689 3,257 793 2,246 
8 Switzerland a 1,404 2,426 1,807 1,879 
9 Luxembourg a 497 2,722 1,420 1,546 
10 Gibraltar a 886 1,190 2,127 1,401 
11 Germany  674 1,860 1,178 1,237 
12 Ukraine 1,601 551 671 941 
13 Hungary -12 542 1,789 773 
14 Belarus 765 619 896 760 
15 Kazakhstan 103 326 974 468 
16 United Arab Emirates 901 240 60 400 
17 Spain a 259 458 371 363 
18 Cayman Islands a 52 718 296 355 
19 Uzbekistan 354 414 223 330 
20 Austria 230 253 458 314 
21 France 257 217 386 287 
22 Bulgaria 168 387 229 261 
23 Czech Republic 248 319 142 236 
24 Armenia 269 266 166 234 
25 Serbia 44 11 609 221 
Top 25 43,555 50,541 41,329 45,142 
Total FDI outflows 45,211 54,202 44,868 48,094 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
 
a The relatively high ranks of these destinations can be explained mainly by the dominance of trans-shipping and round-
tripping FDI as well as FDI in real estate. It should be noted, however, that not all Russian investment in some of these 
locations, e. g., the Netherlands and Switzerland, falls in these categories. 
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Main shareholders Countries with banking affiliates 
1 Sberbank 246,905 60.3% - State (Bank of Russia) Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
2 VTB 84,100 85.5% - State 
Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, 
Cyprus, Georgia, Germany, France, India, Kazakhstan, 
Singapore, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom 




31,570 100% - State No affiliates abroad. 
5 Bank of Moscow 26,803 63.4% - Government of Moscow and its firmsa Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Serbia, Ukraine 
6 VTB-24 23,580 98.9% - VTB No affiliates abroad. 
7 Alfa-Bank 21,372 99.9% - ABH Holding SA (Michael Fridman – 36.5%, 
German Khan – 23.3%, Petr Aven – 13.8%) 
Cyprus, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States 
8 UniCredit Bank 17,033 Subsidiary of UniCredit Bank Austria AG (100%) –b  
9 Raiffeisen Bank 16,503 Subsidiary o Raiffeisen Group, Austria (100%) –b  
10 Promsvyazbank 16,132 72.9% - brothers Dmitriy and Alexey Ananyev No affiliates abroad. 
11 Rosbank 15,446 Subsidiary of Société Générale, France (72%) –b  
12 MDM Bank 14,132 70.6% - MDM Holding SE, Cyprus; in fact, 54.1% - 
Sergey Popov 
Latvia 
13 Uralsib Bank 13,217 94.6% - Financial Corporation Uralsib No affiliates abroad. 
14 Nomos Bank 
9,499 
 
28.2% - Petr Kellner (Czech Republic) via Russia Finance 
Corporation BV, Netherlands, 18.9% - Roman Korbačka 
(Slovak Republic), 18.7% - Alexander Nesis, 12% - 
Nikolay Dobrinov, 12% - Alexey Gudaitis (all of them 
from Russia) via various firms in Cyprus 
No affiliates abroad. 
15 VTB Severo-Zapad 8,446 Subsidiary of VTB (100%) No affiliates abroad. 
 
Source: RBC Rating (available at: http://rating.rbc.ru/articles/2011/02/24/33178170_tbl.shtml?2011/02/24/33177839) and annual reports of banks. 
 
a Since 2011, the main shareholder is VTB (51%). 
b Strictly speaking, foreign banking affiliates are not allowed in Russia and subsidiaries under foreign control are registered as independent local banks. Moreover, leading foreign banks 
sometimes have several subsidiaries in Russia. Thus, the French Société Générale controls not only Rosbank but also Bank Société Générale Vostok, Rusfinans Bank and DeltaKredit.  
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Countries, with year of signing/ratification 
Soviet BITs in 
force 
11 
Finland (the first Soviet BIT, 1989/1991), Belgium and 
Luxembourg (1989/1991), Canada (1989/1991), Federal Republic of 
Germany (1989/1991), France (1989/1991), Netherlands (1989/1991), 
United Kingdom (1989/1991), Austria (1990/1991), Republic of 
Korea (1990/1991), Spain (1990/1991), Switzerland (1990/1991) 
Russian BITs, 
signed before 





USA (limited agreement of 1992.04.03/1992), Bulgaria (1993/2005), 
Cuba (1993/1996), Denmark (1993/1996), Greece (1993/1996), 
Romania (1993/1996), Slovakia (1993/1996), Czech 
Republic (1994/1996), India (1994/1996), Kuwait (1994/1996), 
Vietnam (1994/1996), Albania (1995/1996), Hungary (1995/1996), 
Mongolia (1995/2005), Norway (1995/1998), Sweden (1995/1996), 
Yugoslavia/Serbia (1995/1996), Italy (1996/1996), 
Laos (1996/2005), Egypt (1997/2000), Lebanon (1997/1998), 
Macedonia (1997/1998), Philippines (1997/1998), 
Turkey (1997/1999), Argentine (1998/1999), Japan (1998/2000), 
Moldavia (1998/1999), South Africa (1998/2000), 
Ukraine (1998/2000), Lithuania (1999/2004) 
Russian BITs 
of the new 
type, in force 
17 
Yemen (2002/2005), Syria (2005/2007), China (2006/2009), 
Indonesia (2007/2009), Jordan (2007/2009), Belarus (2008/2010), 
Kazakhstan (2008/2010), Kyrgyzstan (2008/2010), 
Libya (2008/2010), Tajikistan (2008/2010), Venezuela (2008/2009), 
Abkhaziaa (2009/2010), Angola (2009/2010), Namibia (2009/2010), 




not in force 
3 
North Korea (1996/2005), Armenia (2001/2005), Qatar 
(2007/2009) 
BITs changed 
by new BITs 
3 Italy (1989/1991), China (1990/1991), Turkey (1990/1991) 




USA (comprehensive treaty of 1992.06.17/-), Portugal (1994/-), 
Uzbekistan (1997/-), Slovenia (2000/-), Thailand (2002/-), 
Ethiopia (2005/-), Algeria (2006/-), Brunei (2007/-) 
BITs which 
became out of 
date before 
ratification 




Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium and Luxembourg (new version), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Iran, Israel, Latvia (the process was frozen 
because of discrimination against the Russian minority), Malaysia, 
Morocco, Mexico, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania (new version), 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
Sources: Russian legislation, available at: http://www.garant.ru and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, Dvustoronniye soglasheniya o pooshchrenii i vzaimnoy zashchite kapitalovlozheniy, 26.02.2010, available at: 
http://www.mid.ru.  
a Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been recognised by only four members of the United Nations, including Russia.





Annex figure 1. Russia: Breakdown of the foreign assets of the top 20 multinationals, by 









oil & gas companies: LUKOIL,
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steel companies: Evraz, Severstal,
Mechel, NLMK and TMK
non-ferrous metal companies:








Atomenergoprom, OMZ and Acron
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Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
 
Page 24 of 37 
 
 













Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
a This figure normally provides the geographic distribution of foreign assets by industry. Unfortunately, data for all industries was not available. For two major industries, see figure 3a. 
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Annex figure 3а. Russia: Geographic distribution of the foreign assets of the top 20 
multinationals: a comparison of the oil & gas and steel industries, 2009 
 








































Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
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Place of real head office




Source: IMEMO-VCC survey of Russian multinationals, 2011a. 
 
St. Petersburg Head office of Sovcomflot 
Velikiy Novgorod Head office of Acron 
Lipetsk Head office of NLMK 
Vladivostok Head office of FESCO 
Moscow Head offices of the other 16 companies 
Cherepovets Place of official registration of Severstal, although its head office is in Moscow 
Dudinka Place of official registration of Norilsk Nickel, although its head office is in Moscow 
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Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
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Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
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Annex box 1. Current international patents of LUKOIL 
 
No.678644 – 1997-2017 (Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Iran, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Monaco, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Vietnam) 
No.34940 – 1997-2017 (Lithuania) 
No.36704 – 1998-2012 (Estonia) 
No.6734 – 1998-2011 (Turkmenistan) 
No.200829, No.194287 – 1998-2018 (Turkey) 
No.3518690 – since 1998 (United States) 
No.11683 – 1999-2019 (Georgia) 
No.53259, No.53260, 53261, No.53262, No.53263 – 1999-2020 (Cyprus)  
No.3725905, No.3750154 – since 2002 (United States) 
No.838720 – 2004-2014 (Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine) 
No.4501 – 2006-2020 (British Virgin Islands) 
No.57443, No.57446 – since 2007 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo) 
No.301255725 – since 2008 (Hong Kong)  
No.01371586 – since 2009 (Taiwan) 
No.37846, No.378471, No.378478, No.378480, No.378481, No.378482, No.378483, No.378484, 
No.378485, No.378487, No.378840, No.378841, No.378842, No.378845 – since 2009 (Columbia) 
No.79439, No.79440, No.79523, No.79567, No.79576 – since 2009 (Nigeria)  
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ANNEX II. Corporate profiles of the top 20 
 
 
1. LUKOIL (http://www.lukoil.com) 
   
Founded in 1991, LUKOIL is still the largest private oil company in Russia as well as one of the 
largest in the world. The company specializes in the exploration and production of oil and gas, 
the production of petroleum products and other related activities. Its market share is 17.8% of 
Russian oil production and 18.2% of Russian oil refining. Despite the recent global crisis, it has 
retained its position on the world petroleum market. LUKOIL has about 1% of global oil reserves 
and accounts for 2.4% of global oil production. The firm is listed on Russian as well as foreign 
stock exchanges. Its main shareholders are still its President V. Alekperov and its Vice-
President L. Fedun. The main foreign shareholder, ConocoPhillips, sold its 20% share in 2011. The 
main resource base and refineries of LUKOIL are situated in Russia. The resource base is mainly 
in Western Siberia. The refineries are in European Russia as well as Western Siberia. The 
company’s domestic retail network consists of more than 2,000 filling stations in 62 
administrative regions.  
 
LUKOIL has assets in many foreign countries, acquired over a decade and a half of foreign 
expansion. Its first projects focused on the development of its resource base in such countries 
as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Egypt. Later, LUKOIL began to acquire refineries and 
petrochemical plants abroad, in Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. Its last acquisitions were of the 
ISAB refinery (60%) in Italy in 2008-2011 and the TRN refinery (45%) in the Netherlands in 
2009. Foreign refineries now account for more than a third of LUKOIL’s refining capacity. Its 
foreign retail network consists of approximately 4,450 filling stations in 25 countries, including 
the United States (1334 stations at the end of 2009), Turkey (689 stations), Romania (328) and 
Ukraine (297).  
 
2. Gazprom (http://www.gazprom.com) 
  
Gazprom, founded in 1989, is the largest Russian company in the field of exploration, production, 
transportation, storage, processing, and marketing of hydrocarbons. Its main product is natural 
gas. Gazprom also produces and supplies heat and electric power. Its market share declined in 
Russia over 2008-2009 because of the crisis, from 82.7% to 79.2% of gas production and 8.8% 
to 8.4% of oil production. However, Gazprom remains one of the world’s leading companies in its 
sector, with around 18% of global gas reserves, 14.5% of gas production and 22.8% of gas trade. 
It is listed on Russian as well as foreign stock exchanges, although it remains state-controlled, 
with more than half the shares in the hands of the Russian state and state-owned companies. 
Gazprom’s assets are to be found in many Russian regions but the key resources are in Western 
Siberia and on the shelf. Gazprom's gas pipeline length exceeds 160,000 km and the company 
still holds a leading position in Russian gas distribution. 
 
Because of the specifics of the natural gas industry, Gazprom began its expansion abroad in the 
1990s in European countries. Today, it has gas exploration and production projects in Algeria, 
India, Venezuela and Vietnam among other countries. Europe remains a major area for Gazprom’s 
investment in the development of its gas transmission system and for gas sales. The main 
consumers of its gas are Ukraine (17% of foreign sales in 2009), Germany (15%), Turkey (9%), 
and Italy (9%). The company has power plants in Lithuania and Armenia.  
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3. Evraz (http://www.evraz.com) 
  
The Evraz Group, founded in 1992, is a leader in the Russian steel industry. A vertically 
integrated company that produces iron ore, cast iron, steel, rolled metal, coal, and vanadium, it 
ranked 14th among global steel producers in 2009. Unlike other Russian companies, Evraz is 
listed only on a foreign stock exchange (the LSE). More than 71% of the Evraz’s equity is held 
by Lanebrook Ltd., which is controlled by R. Abramovich’s investment firm Millhouse and by 
Evraz CEO A. Frolov and Evraz chairman A. Abramov. The company’s mining assets of iron ore, 
coal and vanadium are located in the Urals and in Siberia. In 2009, Evraz bought a vanadium 
producer in the Tula region. Three Russian steel plants are located in Western Siberia and the 
Urals.  
 
The Group began foreign expansion only in the mid-2000s, with the acquisition of two European 
producers of steel and rolled metal in Italy and the Czech Republic. Today, it controls 
enterprises in Canada, some European countries, South Africa, Ukraine, and the USA. It did not 
acquire any new foreign assets during the crisis.  
 
4. Severstal (http://www.severstal.com) 
  
Severstal was the third largest steel company in Russia in 2009 and one of the world leaders in 
the steel industry. The company was founded in 1993. Within its vertically integrated structure, 
Severstal produces coal, iron ore, steel and rolled metal. In 2007, it began to diversify and 
established a gold division. Severstal’s shares are traded on two Russian stock exchanges (RTS 
and MICEX) and on the LSE. Severstal CEO A. Mordashov still controls more than 82% of the 
company’s share capital. Nowadays, all assets are divided into three divisions: Severstal 
Resources, Severstal Russian Steel and Severstal International. Severstal Resources and 
Severstal Russian Steel include assets mainly in the Russian northwest and Siberia. The key 
region for the company is Volodga, with its Cherepovets steel mill. 
 
Severstal acquired its first foreign assets in 2004. Over the rest of the decade, it purchased a 
number of enterprises in North America, Europe and Africa. Today, Severstal’s foreign 
affiliates produce steel, rolled metal, coal, iron, and gold ore. The key foreign assets are 
situated in Italy, France and the United States.  
 
5. Mechel (http://www.mechel.com) 
  
Founded in the early 2000s, Mechel today is a steel and mining company that produces iron ore, 
iron, steel, nickel, and rolled metal. It also produces electricity. Mechel was the top coking coal 
producer in Russia in 2008 but fell to third place in 2009, as its market share of coking coal 
went from 21% in 2008 to 13% in 2009. It is still one of the largest steel producers in Russia, 
with a market share of 8%. Mechel is listed on the Russian RTS and MICEX stock exchanges as 
well as on the NYSE. The chairman of the board of directors, I. Zyuzin, still controls more than 
65% of Mechel’s equity. The company has four divisions: mining segment, steel segment, 
ferroalloys, and power segments. All four divisions include Russian assets located in Siberia, the 
Urals, and the northwest of the country. 
 
Mechel’s foreign expansion began in 2002, with the acquisition of a steel plant in Romania. Until 
2009, the company’s foreign assets were mainly in Europe, including steel mills in Lithuania and 
Romania, and power plants in Bulgaria. It also owned mining assets in Kazakhstan. In 2009, 
despite the crisis, Mechel acquired the US coal company Bluestone. 
Page 32 of 37 
 
6. Norilsk Nickel (http://www.nornik.ru/en) 
  
Founded as a state concern in 1989, Norilsk Nickel was privatized in the 1990s. Today, it is the 
largest Russian company in the non-ferrous metal industry. It produces mainly copper, nickel, 
platinum and palladium, but also some gold, silver, cobalt and other non-ferrous metals. Because 
of its resource base, Norilsk Nickel is also one of the leading global producers of non-ferrous 
metals. Despite the crisis, the company has retained a global market share of 22% in nickel 
production and 3% in copper. During the crisis, its global market share of palladium fell from 
45% in 2008 to 38% in 2009 and of platinum from 11% to 9%. The company is listed on the LSE 
and on the Berlin and Bremen stock exchanges, as well as on Russian exchanges. The company’s 
main shareholders are its founder, V. Potanin, who owns 25% of its share capital, and UC RUSAL, 
which owns 25.1%. Norilsk Nickel has two main divisions in Russia, which include mining and 
manufacturing assets in East Siberia (in Norilsk) and the Murmansk Region. It also has power 
and transport assets.  
 
Norilsk Nickel acquired its first foreign assets only in 2003, in the United States The company 
has production facilities in Australia, Botswana, Finland, South Africa and the United States. 
Its Australian mines were closed during the global crisis. With its well-developed sales and 
service networks, Norilsk Nickel ranks 3rd among Russian MNEs by geographical diversification. 
 
7. Sovcomflot (http://www.scf-group.com)  
 
Sovcomflot is the leading Russian shipping company, specializing in the overseas transport of oil, 
petroleum products and liquefied gas. Founded in 1988 as a commercial enterprise, Sovcomflot is 
today one of the largest tanker companies in the world and the leader in some segments such as 
arctic shuttle tankers and ice-class LNG carriers. It is also the second largest global operator 
of Aframax tankers. The firm is fully state-owned and headquartered in St. Petersburg. Its 
fleet includes more than 150 vessels of an aggregate 11.8 million dwt.  
 
Sovcomflot has few foreign affiliates. The company does some “investing” by registering the 
fleet under the flag of Cyprus and other countries with lax shipping regulations. Its “classic” 
transport subsidiary is situated only in Spain.  
 
8. Sistema (http://www.sistema.com) 
  
Join-stock financial corporation Sistema is a diversified company with assets in 
telecommunications, high technology (radar, software, biotechnology, etc.), oil production, retail 
sales, banking, media, tourism, and healthcare. The corporation has had a diversified structure 
since its founding in 1993. Today, the key sector for Sistema is telecommunications. Its 
company MTS is one of the global top ten in the field and one of the three largest in Russia. 
Other Sistema companies are also leaders in their industries. For example, the travel agency 
Intourist is the leader in inbound tourism with a market share of 8.7% in 2009. Sistema’s shares 
are traded on two Russian stock exchanges (RTS and MICEX) and on the LSE abroad. Its 
subsidiaries are also listed on the NYSE. Sistema’s chairman of the board, V. Evtushenkov, still 
controls more than 60% of its equity (64.2% in 2009). The Russian assets of Sistema are in 
various regions, mainly in central Russia. 
 
Sistema got its first foreign assets only in 2002 – in Belarus and the Czech Republic. By 2009, 
Sistema had telecom assets in Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia and India 
(within the MTS, Comstar OTS and SSTS subsidiaries); high-tech assets in Ukraine, the Czech 
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Republic, Greece, and Austria (within Sitronics and RTI Systems); and tourism assets in Turkey 
and the United States (within Intourist). 
 
9. NLMK (Novolipetsk Steel) (http://www.nlmksteel.com)  
 
NLMK was founded in the 1990s on the site of a famous Soviet plant in Lipetsk. Today, it 
produces mainly iron, steel, rolled metal, and iron ore. It also produces coke and coal and has 
transport assets. With its key mill in Lipetsk, NLMK commands a strong market share in Russia, 
producing about 17% of Russian steel in 2009. Its Russian market share in coke was 11.5%, in 
cold-rolled steel 23%, and in iron-ore concentrate 22%. NLMK used the crisis to reinforce its 
position in world markets. In 2009, its share in the world slab market reached 18%, as compared 
to 11% in 2008. The company is listed on the three most popular stock exchanges among Russian 
companies: RTS, MICEX and LSE. More than 79% of NLMK’s equity is held by Fletcher Group 
Holding Ltd., which is controlled by NLMK chairman V. Lisin. Key assets of the company are 
located in Central Russia; resource assets are also located in the Urals and Western Siberia.  
 
NLMK began its foreign expansion only in 2005, with the acquisition of a steel producer in 
Denmark. By 2009, the company had assets in a number of European countries (e. g., Belgium, 
Italy and France) and in the United States. It acquired no new foreign assets during the crisis.  
 
10. VimpelCom (http://www.vimpelcom.com)  
 
VimpelCom is one of the leaders in the Russian mobile communication market with its key brand 
known as “Beeline”. It was founded in 1992 and now provides an integrated service through 
wireless, fixed and broadband technologies. At the end of 2009, its market share in Russia was 
24.7%, roughly what it had been before the crisis. In 2009, VimpelCom’s brand “Beeline” became 
one of the top ten most expensive global brands in telecommunication. VimpelCom has been 
listed on the NYSE since 1996. Since 2000, VimpelCom’s shares have also traded on RTS. Key 
shareholders of the company in 2009 were the Russian Alfa Group (44%) and Norwegian Telenor 
(29.9%). VimpelCom can provide its services in most Russian regions. In 2009, the company had 
50.9 million subscribers in Russia. 
 
VimpelCom’s foreign service affiliates are mostly in the CIS. In 2009, they were to be found in 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2009, VimpelCom also 
began to provide mobile services in Vietnam and Cambodia. In 2010, VimpelCom changed the 
whole strategy of its foreign expansion, with the aim of building a global telecom company 
headquartered in the Netherlands. It is unclear whether it will show up among the Russian top 
20 in the next report. 
 
11. RENOVA (http://www.renova.ru)  
 
The conglomerate RENOVA was founded in 1990. It owns assets in oil production, machinery, 
construction, energy, chemicals, telecommunications, nano-technologies, and the non-ferrous 
metal industry, among others. RENOVA also has its own direct and portfolio investment funds. 
It is an unlisted private firm. The key figure in this conglomerate is still its founder, 
V. Vekselberg. RENOVA’s assets are located in Central Russia, the Urals, the Far Eastern and 
some other Russian regions. During the crisis, the company worked to enlarge its business. In 
2009, RENOVA created a joint venture with Rusnano that would produce thin-film solar 
modules.  
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The main country for RENOVA is still Russia, but the conglomerate also has several foreign 
subsidiaries acquired mostly over 2005-2007. These assets are located in Belarus, Italy, 
Switzerland and the United States. RENOVA has also invested in Latvia and South Africa.  
 
12. TMK (http://www.tmk-group.com)  
 
TMK is the largest pipe producer in Russia, founded only in 2001. It produces almost all types of 
pipes, especially those used in the oil and gas, energy, chemicals, aviation, and construction 
industries. The company produced nearly 60% of all Russian seamless pipes and about 70% of 
the seamless OCTG pipes in 2009. In the same year, TMK’s global market share was 13% in 
seamless OCTG pipes. The crisis led to TMK falling, over 2008-2009, from the second to the 
third place as a global pipe producer. TMK is listed on the Russian stock exchanges RTS and 
MICEX and on the LSE abroad. In 2009, 74.8% of TMK’s equity was held by TMK Steel Ltd., 
which was controlled by TMK’s chairman D. Pympyanskiy. TMK’s Russian assets include four key 
enterprises located in Central Russia and the Urals. 
 
Foreign expansion is not the main direction of TMK’s development. Although it began expanding 
abroad in 2002, its production affiliates are now limited to Kazakhstan, Romania and the United 
States. TMK’s foreign sales network is more developed. It includes offices in Italy, Germany, 
Switzerland, China, Singapore, South Africa and several CIS countries. In 2009, TMK created a 
new subsidiary consolidating all its European assets.  
 
13. INTER RAO UES (http://www.interrao.ru/eng) 
 
The state-controlled INTER RAO UES was founded in 1997. It specializes in the generation and 
distribution of electric power. It is one of the leaders in the Russian power sector, with a 23% 
share of installed capacity in 2009. The company generated 7.4% of Russian electric power in 
2009. Because of its specialization and its shareholders, INTER RAO UES is listed only on the 
Russian RTS and MICEX. State-owned companies Rosatom and Rosenergoatom controlled over 
55% of its equity. The company’s assets are located in Central Russia and include 4 power plants. 
 
INTER RAO UES has more than 20 affiliates in 14 countries. The first foreign assets to be 
acquired were in the CIS countries (Armenia and Georgia) in 2003. Generation plants and 
distributors of electricity later became a part of the firm’s network in other CIS and Europeans 
countries. In 2009, the foreign power-producing plants of the company were located in Armenia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan and Moldova. INTER RAO UES is also engaged in the import and export of 
electric power, importing power mainly from Kazakhstan and Georgia, and exporting 86% of 
Russian-generated electric power to Finland and Belarus.  
 
14. Zarubezhneft (http://www.nestro.ru)  
 
Founded in 1967, Zarubezhneft is the oldest company in the Russian oil and gas sector. It 
specializes in the exploration, development and operation of oil and gas fields, as well as in the 
construction and operation of oil refineries, pipelines, and other oil and gas infrastructure. 
Zarubezhneft is not listed on either Russian or foreign stock exchanges, as it is fully state-
owned and has the status of a strategic enterprise. It has always been outward-oriented and 
has very few Russian assets, those being mainly in Central Russia and the Urals. More recently, 
however, the firm has begun to develop its Russian division, including oil production in the 
Nenets Autonomous region. 
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At various times, Zarubezhneft’s international activity has encompassed such diverse locations 
as Algeria, Angola, Cuba, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, and Syria. In 2009, the firm operated in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Vietnam.  
 
15. UC RUSAL (http://www.rusal.ru/en)  
 
RUSAL was founded in 2000. A major milestone was the 2007 merger with its Russian 
competitor SUAL and the aluminium business of Swiss Glencore, which turned Rusal into United 
Company RUSAL or UC RUSAL. Today, UC RUSAL is the largest producer of aluminum in the 
world and the only aluminum producer in Russia. Its global market share in aluminum production 
was about 10% in 2009, despite the crisis and a decrease in production. The company was also 
the fourth largest producer of alumina with approximately 10% of global output in 2009. In 
addition to aluminium and alumina, RUSAL produces bauxite, nepheline ore, alloys, foil and 
packaging materials. It also has a power-generating division. Despite its global position, RUSAL 
was listed on stock exchanges only at the beginning of 2010. At the beginning of 2010, its main 
shareholders were the En+ Group of O. Deripaska’s Basic Element, the founder of RUSAL, 
(47.6% of the company’s equity in 2009), Onexim Holding (17.1%) and SUAL (15.9%). The basis 
of RUSAL’s business is its Russian assets in Siberia, the Urals and Central Russia. They included 
13 aluminum smelters, 4 alumina refineries and 2 bauxite mines.  
 
The foreign expansion of RUSAL began in the early 2000s, with the acquisition of assets in the 
CIS countries and in Guinea. Foreign activities widened in the second half of the 2000s, 
especially in 2007, when UC RUSAL was founded. As a result, RUSAL now has assets in Ukraine, 
Armenia, Italy, Sweden, Ireland, Guinea, Nigeria, China, Guyana, Jamaica, and some other 
countries. It acquired no new foreign assets of any size in 2009.  
 
16. Atomenergoprom (http://www.atomenergoprom.ru/en/)  
 
The fully state-owned Atomenergoprom (Atomic Energy Power Corporation) was founded in 
2007 by order of the President of Russia. Formally, it is a part of Rosatom, the State Atomic 
Energy Corporation. The company specializes in the nuclear industry and produces uranium, 
constructs nuclear power plants and other equipment, and generates energy. Its Russian 
experience in the nuclear field makes it the global leader in nuclear power plant construction 
abroad. In 2009, the company was the fifth global producer of uranium and the second largest 
holder of uranium reserves. Its global market share of uranium enrichment services was about 
40%. Atomenergoprom is not listed on stock exchanges but its bonds were placed on MICEX in 
2009. The company’s assets in Russia are spread over many regions, including Siberia, the Urals 
and Central Russia. 
 
Atomenergoprom’s activities abroad are also widespread. In 2009, the company had mining 
projects in Kazakhstan, South Africa and Canada, among other countries, and service affiliates 
in the EU, South Korea and Japan. Significant foreign investments, however, date only from 
2009.  
 
17. FESCO (http://www.fesco.ru/en)  
 
Founded as a joint-stock company in 1992, FESCO today is the leading transport and logistics 
company in Russia. With 56 vessels of 0.8 million dwt, 24 container ships and 16,000 units of the 
rolling stock, FESCO specializes in shipping, rail transport and port services. It also provides 
sophisticated cargo services. FESCO’s shares are traded on the Russian RTS and MICEX. The 
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key shareholder in 2009 was still the same: the Industrial Investors Group, which owned 55.8% 
of FESCO’s share capital, with its founder S. Generalov serving as FESCO’s president. FESCO 
had assets in the many Russian regions that its specialization in cargo services requires. 
However, its main activities were concentrated in the Far Eastern region in Primorskiy Krai, 
where key terminals are located. Its port division also included assets in European Russia (St. 
Petersburg and Novorossiysk).  
 
Foreign activities are a part of usual business of FESCO. The company established its first 
foreign affiliate in 1995 in Australia. By 2009, FESCO had foreign assets in a number of 
countries, including China, the United States, Hong Kong (China), and Australia. The main part of 
FESCO’s fleet was registered in countries with special shipping legislation, such as Cyprus, the 
British Virgin Islands and the Marshall Islands). 
 
18. Polyus Zoloto (http://www.polyusgold.com/eng)  
 
Polyus Zoloto was established only in 2006. It is the largest producer of gold in Russia and a 
leading one in Kazakhstan. Polyus Zoloto can be also related to global leaders of the gold sector. 
In 2009, the company became only the eleventh in gold production in the world but it was the 
fourth global gold producer by reserves. As other Russian companies, Polyus Zoloto is listed on 
the RTS and MICEX, as well as on the LSE and the over-the-counter market in the United 
States. The main shareholders of the company were its management, especially its CEO, 
M. Prohorov. Polyus Zoloto’s Russian mining activities are concentrated in Siberia and the Far 
Eastern region. 
 
Polyus Zoloto began its foreign expansion only in 2009. During the crisis, the company acquired a 
50.1% interest in KazakhGold Group and became the owner of mining assets in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Romania.  
 
19. OMZ (http://www.omz.ru/eng/)  
 
Founded in 1996, OMZ is a leading Russian heavy engineering company. It specializes in the 
engineering, production, sales and maintenance of equipment and machines for the nuclear 
power, oil & gas, and mining industries; and also in the production of special steels and equipment 
for other industries. In 2009, OMZ was one of the top five global producers of large special 
steel products and its Russian market share in special steel was 15%. The company is also the 
only producer of several types of equipment in Russia. OMZ’s shares trade on a number of stock 
exchanges, both domestic and foreign. The ownership structure of the company did not change 
significantly after K. Bendukidze, the founder, sold his shares in 2004. In 2009, Forpost-
Management owned 41.1% of OMZ’s shares and Investresurs owned 18.3%. However, 
Gazprombank was the real chief shareholder. OMZ does not have assets in many Russian regions. 
Its activities are concentrated in St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
 
During the crisis, OMZ acquired no new foreign assets. As a result, the company still has foreign 
plants only in the Czech Republic (as well as service affiliates in Armenia, the Netherlands and 
the British Virgin Islands).  
 
20. Acron (http://www.acron.ru/en)  
 
Acron is one of Russia’s leading producers of mineral fertilizers, ammonia, and organic and non-
organic compounds. In 2009, its Russian market share in the production of nitrogen and 
Page 37 of 37 
 
phosphate fertilizers was about 13%. Acron is listed on the Russian RTS and MICEX, as well as 
on the LSE in Europe. The formal shareholders of Acron in 2009 were four limited companies, 
all controlled by V. Kantor, who owned 71.5% of Acron’s equity in 2009. Acron’s Russian assets 
include two key enterprises located in Central and North-Western Russia, in addition to mining 
projects in the Urals and the Murmansk region. The company also has transport assets. 
 
Acron acquired its first foreign assets in China in 2005. The crisis did not impede the further 
expansion of the company. In 2009, Acron put into operation its port terminal in Estonia and 
also created a new sale subsidiary in Switzerland. As a result, Acron’s foreign assets that year 
included a mining project in Canada; sales divisions in China, Switzerland and the United States; 
transport assets in Estonia; and a production facility in China. 
 
